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AUGMENTING THE WAGE OF THE LOW WAGE WORKER:
WAGE SUBSIDY VS. MINIMUM WAGE
ABSTRACT
In an attempt to augment the lowest wages, the U.S. and other
countries utilize legal minimum wages. Their potentially adverse
employment effects, however, give many economists pause.
Is there an alternative way to assist the low wage worker but
avoid dis employment effects? In this paper, the effect of a wage sub-
sidy on employment and wages (gross and net) is analyzed. The analy-
sis reveals that a wage subsidy can elevate the lowest wages while, at
the same time, leaving positive employment effects. The most effi-
cient approach, however, turns out to be a combination wage subsidy/
minimum wage policy.

AUGMENTING THE WAGE OF THE LOW WAGE WORKER:
WAGE SUBSIDY VS. MINIMUM WAGE
R. D. Husby*
Minimum wages, traditionally, have been criticized for their
potentially adverse employment effects. The competitive model
suggests that a minimum wage above the competitive wage causes a
reduction in employment, the magnitude depending on the elasticity of
the demand for labor. The monopsony model, on the other hand,
suggests that a minimum wage above the monopsony wage actually
increases employment, provided that the wage floor is not set too
high. The analyses of the minimum wage using the competitive and
monopsonistic models are well known and need not be repeated here.
A wage subsidy, under which policy makers would determine a target
wage and then pay some percent (e.g., 50 percent) of the difference
between the target wage and one's lower wage, was discussed briefly
during the early 1970s, primarily as an alternative to the negative
2
income tax. It is the purpose of this paper to analyze the wage sub-
sidy as an alternative not to the NIT but to the minimum wage. The
conclusion is that a wage subsidy may be preferable to a minimum wage
on employment grounds, but more important, a combination of the two
—
a minimum wage plus a wage subsidy—is preferable to either 'one by
itself.
Associate Professor of Economics, University of Illinois. The
author would like to thank Francine Blau, Earl Grinols, A. James
Heins, and William Lord for their helpful comments.
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ThroughouC this paper, it will be assumed that workers respond
only to the wage that they receive and not at all to the wage that
employers pay. That is to say, workers are indifferent to whether
3
their employer shares in the benefits of a wage subsidy.
In Section I, the notion that wage subsidies may be preferable to
minimum wages in introduced. In Section II, we introduce the idea of
a combined minimum wage/wage subsidy policy and its superiority over
either a minimum wage or wage subsidy by itself. Then in Section III,
consumer and producer surplus is used in a discussion of the pros and
cons of the minimum wage vs. wage subsidies vs. a combined policy.
Concluding remarks are included in Section IV.
I. Augmenting the Wage of Low-wage Workers
Suppose that policy makers wish to augment the lowest wages such
that no worker receives less than od. (see Figure 1). This could be
accomplished with a minimum wage of W . In the competitive labor
min
market depicted in Figure 1, workers would receive a wage equal to od
from their employer, but employment would fall from N to N .
Alternatively, a compensation level of od could be accomplished with a
wage subsidy, target wage W 9 , the subsidy being 50 percent of the
difference between the target wage and the competitive or going wage.
In this case, rv becomes the supply curve defined as the relationship
between the wage that the employer pays and the quantity supplied of
labor (see Appendix for further detail). Employment in this case
would actually increase to N , the employer would pay net wage W , and
s n
the worker would receive gross wage od. The extents to which the net
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wage of the employer would fall below and the gross wage of the
employee would rise above the competitive wage depends upon the
elasticity of supply (see Appendix).
In the monopsony case (see Figure 2) , let us consider a 50 percent
wage subsidy, target wage W „. Ironically, in this case, the employer
could end up paying a zero or negative wage. A.s Figure 2 is drawn,
the employer would pay the negative wage W , with the employee
receiving a gross wage of W .
This author suggests, however, that public policy makers and
public opinion would not accept a program in which powerful and/or
wealthy firms would pay zero or negative wages. Undoubtedly, the law
would initially be written or ultimately amended to prevent this from
occurring. If so, there would in fact be a minimum wage in addition
to the wage subsidy. Explicitly forbiding zero or negative wages
would be equivalent to a minimum wage of $0.01. The possibility of a
minimum suggests that one might be able to legislate a wage subsidy
along with a nontrivial minimum wage which would maintain the advan-
4
tages of a minimum wage while eliminating the disadvantages.
II. Combining a Minimum Wage and a Wage Subsidy
The analysis of a combined policy for the monopsony case is made
with the assistance of Figure 2. In order to prevent a raonopsonist
from usurping most of a wage subsidy, the following policy could be
implemented. The government passes a minimum wage, say, equal to the
wage at which supply equals demand, that wage being W or W . in the°cmin
figure. In the absence of any public policy, the monopsonist would
-4-
hire N at wage W . If the policy were to have only a wage subsidy
M M
(target wage W„-,), the raonopsonist would hire N
TJ M,
= N . The gross
s c
wage would then be W , and the net wage, in this case negative, would
be W .
n
If, however, there is a minimum wage (equal to W ) combined with
c
a wage subsidy (with target wage WT -)» then the monopsony would hire
N (=N ) and pay the employees a net wage of W . Although the
min,s c c
raonopsonist would obviously be worse off compared to a hands off
policy, workers just as obviously benefit. Not only would employment
rise (to N
. ), but also the gross wage including subsidy would be
min, s
W + S, rather than W .
c g
Such a combined policy would also yield favorable results for
competitive labor markets. With the assistance of Figure 1, we see
that the minimum wage by itself yields employment of N with wage
m
W . • If, however, there were a minimum wage of W combined with a
rain c
wage subsidy (target wage WT ,)> then employment would rise to the com-
petitive level (N ), the gross wage would be W + S = W
.
,
and the
c c min
net wage would be W • Clearly, if the wage target and minimum wage
were chosen carefully, the employee wage could remain at the previous
minimum wage level at the same time that employment increases to the
competitive level. (With a wage subsidy by itself [target wage, W ? ] ,
employment would be N , the gross wage would be od = W , and the net
s rain
wage W .
)
n
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III. Wage Subsidie s, Minimum Wages, and Consumer/Producer Surp lus
Considering simple Marshallian consumer and producer surplus, it
can be shown that surplus would be higher for the combination of a
"competitive" minimum wage and a wage subsidy as compared to either a
simple minimum wage or simple wage subsidy. Initially, in this dis-
cussion, it is assumed that employee to employer bribes that would, in
effect, negate the wage subsidy, do not take place: they are illegal
and enforcement is 100 percent effective.
Suppose that society or policy makers have decided that the lowest
paid workers should not receive less than od (see Figure 1). In a
perfectly competitive market (wage equal to W ) , total surplus would
be abo (employer surplus abc plus employee surplus cbo). Remuneration
equal to od could be achieved, first, by minimum wage legislation.
With minimum wage W
. ,
surplus would be ade + defo, a loss of ebf.
° min
Second, it could be achieved with a wage subsidy, target wage W .
The employer would pay ok, with a government subsidy equal to kd. The
surplus here would be derived as follows. The worker surplus is dpo
which can be subdivided into kfo + debfk + epb. Employer surplus is
ask equal to ade + debfk + bfs. Subtracting the taxpayer loss of dpsk
(equal to debfk + epb + bfs + pbs) yields aed + debfk + kfo - pbs or
abo less pbs. The loss of surplus here is pbs. (As drawn, pbs = ebf,
and thus the loss in surplus from the wage subsidy is identical to the
loss from the minimum wage, but these losses will not, in general, be
equal. )
Third, the combination of a minimum wage, but at W
,
plus a wage
c
subsidy (target wage now W,,,. ) yields a subsidized wage of W + S
11 c
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(equal to od or W
.
), with no loss of surplus. The worker surplusmm
would be dgbo, the employer surplus would be abc , and the taxpayer
loss dgbc, yielding a total surplus of abo, the same as in the
laissez-faire competitive case.
With the combined policy and a subsidized wage at W + S, there
c
would be unemployment of N - N . It has been suggested that, in a
competitive market, the unemployed would bid the effective wage, via
bribes, back down to W . The unemployed would, so the argument goes,
c
offer bribes to potential employers in order to secure employment.
The competitive solution would be a bribe equal to the subsidy (cd),
resulting in an effective competitive wage at W .
c
This argument can be refuted, however, on the following grounds.
First, if such behavior would take place with a combined minimum
wage/wage subsidy policy, it would certainly also take place with a
minimum wage only. The unemployed would be in even larger numbers in
the latter case (N -N in Figure 1). To what extent such behavior
s m
exists in the U.S. today is beyond the scope of this paper. This
author, however, is unaware of any evidence that such bribes take
place currently.
Second, we can say that, from a theoretical welfare point of view,
the enforcement costs must be compared to the welfare losses. First,
let us compare the combined minimum wage/wage subsidy policy with the
laissez-faire case. The welfare loss of the combined policy would
simply be the enforcement costs of insuring that no bribes take place
since there are no welfare losses when enforcement costs are ignored.
Second, comparing the combined policy with the minimum wage only,
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assume that the enforcement costs are the same whether it be a minimum
wage or the combined policy. (If they were not equal, they would pre-
sumably be more in the case of a minimum wage due to the higher
unemployment). In this case, the welfare gain from the combined
policy would simply be the aforementioned area ebf. If enforcement
costs were greater in the case of a minimum wage only, then the
welfare gain from the combined policy would be ebf plus the reduced
enforcement costs.
Turning to monopsony, with no public policy, the monopsony wage
would be W , and total surplus would be opr (employee surplus) + frarp
ra
(employer surplus) = fmro (see Figure 2). If the government forced
monopsonists to pay the "competitive" wage, i.e., if the minimum wage
were set at W . * W , then surplus would be fco, a gain of racr. If
min c
the policy goal were that the worker receive compensation equal to oa,
and if achieved with minimum wage W
. „, then the surplus reverts back.
rainz
to fmro (employee surplus amro plus employer surplus fraa). However,
this higher wage and the highest possible surplus can be simulta-
neously achieved with the combination wage subsidy/minimum wage which
involves a subsidy from taxpayer to low wage worker. Given target
wage W
. , and a minimum wage equal to W , the wage plus subsidy would14 C
be W + S (=W
.
). The employee surplus is abco , employer surplus is
c minz
fck, and the combined employee/taxpayer surplus is kco for a total
surplus of fco. Surprisingly, and in contrast to the competitive
case, this level of total surplus is also attainable with a wage sub-
sidy alone. By choosing the higher target wage WT ^, employment would
be N (the point at which MFC intersects demand), the gross wage
*- net
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would be W , and the net wage W . Employee surplus is ock, employer
c n
surplus is fchi, and the taxpayer loss is kchi. Thus, the combined
employer/taxpayer surplus is fck, yielding a total of fco. However,
only with the combined strategy are both the higher wage (W . _) andJ minZ
this level of surplus (fco) obtainable. In the monopsony case, the
combination of a minimum wage equal to the "competitive wage" plus a
wage subsidy leads to greater surplus than a minimum wage only policy.
Also, the combined policy avoids the possibility, discussed in
Section 1, of an employer paying zero or negative wages.
IV . Conclusion
The most important conclusion of this paper is that, given the
policy maker's desired wage level for low wage workers, a combined
minimum wage/wage subsidy policy is preferable to a minimum wage only.
If it is the policy maker's goal to assure the low wage worker
remuneration equal to od (=W . =W +S ) , the combined policy is clearly
rain c
superior to the minimum wage: both employment and surplus is higher
with the combined policy. The possibility exists that enforcement or
queueing losses could occur with the combined policy, but if so, those
losses would be at least as great with the minimum wage only.
The second conclusion is that wage subsidies, whether combined
with a minimum wage or not, are a worthy subject for public policy
discussion. In comparing the wage subsidy only with the combined
policy, one would have to compare the deadweight loss (pbs in Figure 1)
of the wage subsidy with the enf orcement/queueing costs of the combined
-9-
policy. If the deadweight loss of the wage subsidy exceeded the en-
forcement costs of the combined policy, then the combined policy would
still be preferable on efficiency grounds. If, on the other hand,
maximum employment were the policy goal, then the simple wage subsidy
is the policy of choice.
-10-
NOTES
And provided that the monopsony does not go out of business as a
result of the higher wage.
2
See Barth and Greenburg (1971), Kesselman (1969), Zeckhauser
(1971), Browning (1973), and Kesselman (1973).
3
In reality, this assumption may not always capture actual behavior.
One can imagine, for example, that if employees of a large corporation
learned of a government wage subsidy which appeared to promise, say, a
$2.50 boost in their wages, but when implemented, led to a $1 (or
perhaps no) boost, with the corporation "expropriating" the remainder,
it could lead to labor/management confrontation.
4
This is in stark contrast to the statement in Browning (1973)
that "for a [wage subsidy] to function properly, it is important that
the minimum wage law be repealed."
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APPENDIX
AI. Wage Subsidi es and the Competitive Model
In this appendix, we discuss the effects of a wage subsidy on
employment, gross wage, and net wage, and how those effects vary with
the elasticity of supply.
Consider the linear model,
(1) S
N
: W = f + eN
(2) D : W = a - bN,
where S XT and D refer to the supply of and demand for labor, W is theN N
wage rate, and N is the number of workers. A simple linear model can
be used without any loss of generality. Solving the model, the
competitive full employment level and the competitive wage are
(3a) N = (a - f)/(e + b) and
c
(3b) W = a - b(^-^4),
c e + b
where N and W stand for the competitive employment and wage, respec-
c c
tively. [In the special case of a perfectly inelastic supply curve,
the supply curve would be of the form N = N where N is some fixed
K. K.
labor supply. In this case, the competitive wage would be equal to
(3b* ) W = a - bN .
]
c k
However, if a wage subsidy were introduced in which the subsidy were
(4) S = s(W
T
" W),
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where S is the subsidy, W is the target wage, and s is the subsidy
rate, then the supply curve would be
(5) W + s(W"
T
- W) - f + eN,
since, by assumption, the workers would continue to respond to the
actual wage received, i.e., the subsidized wage. Solving for W yields
(6) W = (f + eN - sW
T
)/(l - s).
Equation (6) is a supply curve relating the number of workers willing
to work at various wage levels that the employers must pay (henceforth
referred to as the net wage, W ). Solving for employment and the net
n
wage, we find
(1 - s)a - f + sW
and
(1 - s)a - f + sW
(8) W - a - b[ n rr—
;
:
-].
n (1 - s)b + e
The subsidized or gross wage is
(9) W - W + s(W~, - W ).
g n T n
What is the impact of a wage subsidy? In the special case of a
perfectly inelastic supply curve , the supply curve would take Che form,
N = N
,
a function that would be unaffected by the wage subsidy.
Hence, in this case, the net wage would equal a - bN (see 3b'), the
same wage that the employer would pay in the absence of a subsidy.
Thus the entire subsidy would accrue to the employee .
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In the case of a perfectly elastic supp ly curve , where e = 0, just
the opposite happens. In this case,
and
(11) W = a - b(^-^-) = f.
C D
If the wage subsidy (4) is adopted, then
f - sW„
where N stands for the employment level after the subsidy comes into
effect, and the net wage is
f ~ sW„
The wage subsidy in this case would cause the net wage paid by
the firms to fall and consequently employment to rise:
N > N .
s c
The proof of this follows. From (10) and (12), we assert
M^ *
f
"
SW
T
,
a fU^ b b(l - s) ? b b *
Since the first terra on each side of the inequality is identical, we
ask then if
b(l - sT < b ?
-15-
If the wage target, W , were equal to f, f being the vertical inter-
cept of the supply curve, then the wage subsidy would be zero, and
f - sf f
b(l - s) b *
If W > f, then
f " sWT f - sf _ f
b(l - s) b(l - s) b
*
This proves that employment would be higher with the wage subsidy.
The gross wage would be
W = W + s(W_ - W )
g n T n
f " sW (f - sW )
.__I
+s[Wt --t-7T-]
- f.
Thus, we see that the gross wage including the subsidy, W , is equal
to the wage prior to the subsidy program. The employee is no better
off. In this case, the entire subsidy would accrue to the employer .
In the intermediate case of a supply curve which is neither per-
fectly elastic nor perfectly inelastic, N , the employment with the
s
wage subsidy, is greater than N : once again, we assert that
N > N .
s c
From (7) and (3a), we have
(1 - s)a - f + sW_ B _ .
(1 - s)b + e e + b *
-16-
Rewr icing
,
< 15 > 7i ° T/l*(1 - s )b + e
(f - sW
T
)
- >
(1 - s)b + e e + b e+b
We have just proved Chat Chis inequalicy holds for Che case of e =
(14). Adding e Co Che denorainaCor does noC nullify Che inequalicy, so
N > N .
s c
EraploymenC does increase as a resulc of Che subsidy. In Chis inter-
mediaCe case, Che neC wage is less Chan Che pre-subsidy corapecicive
wage (which in Curn explains why employment is higher), buc Che gross
2
wage is higher Chan Che pre-subsidy corapecicive wage. The proof of
Chis is oraicted.
The inCermediaCe case is illusCrated in Figure 1. The corapecicive
solucion is a wage and eraploymenc of W and N . Wich a minimum wage
c c
at 'i
.
,
employmenc falls Co N . Wich a wage subsidy (CargeC wage W ),
rain ra Tl
firms would hire up Co N , Che poinC aC which demand inCersecCs Che
"neC" supply curve, S . The neC supply curve shows Che relaCionship
n
beCween Che quancicy of labor supplied and Che wage paid by Che
employer . The gross wage received by Che worker is W along Che con-
vencional supply curve (which shows Che relaCionship between Che quan-
cicy of labor supplied and Che wage received by Che worker). The
advanCage of Che wage subsidy is Chac a rerauneraCion level equal Co
W
.
can be achieved wichouc Che diseraployraenC ef feces. In face, in
min
Chis inCermediaCe case, eraploymenc would exceed Che corapecicive
employment level. A more lengthy and formal discussion of the pros
and cons of a wage subsidy can be found in Section V.
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AII. Wage Subsidies and the Monopsonistic Model
Consider the same linear model,
(1) S
N
: W = f + eN
(2) D
N
: W = a - bN.
Total factor cost would be
TFC^ = WN = fN + eN
,
so the marginal factor cost would be
MFC,, = f + 2eN.
N
The monopsonist would hire the number of workers at which
VMP
N
= MFC
N ,
i.e.
,
a - bN = f + 2eN.
Solving for N,
(16) NM =
a "
I ,M 2e + b
where N is the monopsony employment. The wage is then determined by
the supply curve since the monopsonist would pay "the least that the
traffic would bear":
W = f + eN = f + e(
a
"
f
)M
v
2e + b
-18-
( 1 7
)
ef + b f + ae
2e + b '
where W is the monopsony wage.
If a wage subsidy were passed in which the subsidy were
S = s(W - W), then the supply curve would be
W + s(w_ - W) - f + eN,
since we are still assuming the worker would respond to the subsidized
wage. Solving for W:
(18) W = (f + eN - sW )/(l - s).
With the subsidized wage, the marginal factor cost would be
(f + 2eN - sW )/(l - s). The raonopsonist would hire at
VMP
N
= MFC
N
,
i.e.,
a - bN = (f + 2eN - sW )/(l - s).
Solving for N, the number of workers would be
a(l - s) - f + sw^
(19) N
MS b(l - s) + 2e
where N is the "subsidized" monopsony employment. The net wage that the
MS
raonopsonist would have to pay to attract this number of workers would be
WM = (f + eN - sW_)/(l - s),M ,n T
•19-
the gross wage (including subsidy) being
WM = f + eN.M,g
Employment increases, because of the subsidy, in the monopsony case,
also.
N > N
MS M
a(l - s) - f + sWT ,
_
.
1_ . a - r
b(l - s) + 2e " 2e + b
The proof of this is as follows.
For e = (perfectly elastic supply),
ad -s) f(1 - SV , a f
b(l - s) b(l - s) b b '
For W = f (zero subsidy),
a f(l - s)
=
a
_
f
b " b(l - s) "" b "' b
If W > f, then
N > N .
MS M
Adding 2e to the denominator for the case in which e * 0, does not
change this result.
The monopsony case is diagrammed in Figure 2. Given a government's
hands off policy, the raonopsonist would hire N of wage W . A minimum
M M
wage equal to W would increase employment to N
.
,s. A wage subsidy
c mm
in which the worker would end up with a gross wage equal to W would
-20-
necessitate a target wage of W -,. The "net" marginal factor cost
curve would be MFC . Employment would be the same (N ) as with
net c
minimum wage, W . . The net wage, W , as drawn, is negative.
° min n °
-21-
APPENDIX NOTES
Workers benefit, however, in the sense that more of them would be
employed at the competitive wage.
2
The case of a backward bending supply curve is not treated here.
In Michael Barth (1974), he points out that if labor supply is back-
ward bending over the relevant range, "post subsidy equilibrium market
wage rates would be higher and hours worked lower than their presub-
sidy values" (p. 576), opposite of the positively sloped case.
-10-
NOTES
And provided that the monopsony does not go out of business as a
result of the higher wage.
2
See Barth and Greenburg (1971), Kesselman (1969), Zeckhauser
(1971), Browning (1973), and Kesselman (1973).
3
In reality, this assumption may not always capture actual behavior.
One can imagine, for example, that if employees of a large corporation
learned of a government wage subsidy which appeared to promise, say, a
$2.50 boost in their wages, but when implemented, led to a $1 (or
perhaps no) boost, with the corporation "expropriating" the remainder,
it could lead to labor/management confrontation.
4
This is in stark contrast to the statement in Browning (1973)
that "for a [wage subsidy] to function properly, it is important that
the minimum wage law be repeated."
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Figure 1 Competitive labor market: A
remuneration level of od can be
achieved with a minimum wage at Wm:j_,
a 50% wage subsidy (target wage WT2 )
,
or a combination minimum wage (at Wc )
plus 50% wage subsidy (target wage
WT1 ) . The wage subsidy by itself
maximizes employment, but the
combination policy is the most
efficient, yielding a total surplus
of area abo, the same as in the
laissez-faire, competitive case.
L^O^q e.
^+S*K*z
WM ;K = VvA = W^
QutLKtcly oT X &~b or
Figure 2. Monopsony labor market:
Worker compensation level oa can be
achieved either with minimum wage
wmin2 or a combination minimum wage
(at Wmin ) plus wage subsidy (target
wage WT4 ) . In the latter case, total
surplus is maximized at area fco.
This surplus could also be achieved
with a simple wage subsidy (target
wage WT3 ) , but the worker would then
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